First of all, the concept of nuclear deterrence emerged with the use and spread of nuclear weapons, as it first comes to mind. One important illustration of this, since the atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons have been regarded as the ultimate weapon unmatched by any other weapon system.

Secondly, the important issue is nuclear deterrents were used to prevent the threat of nuclear attack and began life as a threat to destroy cities. (Not so surprising after Hiroshima) (Wilson 2008).Thus, a question comes to mind, when was the concept of nuclear deterrence first introduced? At the beginning of the Cold War period, which was spent in an environment of vagueness and force, deterrence theory emerged and even developed.
Another important issue I would like to mention is the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, which underpins the concept of deterrence. The 2017 agreement negotiations were the first multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in more than two decades and the first negotiations by the most comprehensive United Nations body, the United Nations(UN) General Assembly. Their mandate was to “negotiate a legally binding instrument to ban nuclear weapons and ensure their complete elimination.I would like to summarize the treaty with a word from Peter Maurer, Chairman of the International Committee of the Red Cross: "Today, the world has taken a historic step to de-legitimize these indiscriminate and inhuman weapons, which are a very important basis for their elimination."
In conclusion, we will take a superficial look at the structures of deterrence theories applied by countries at various times from the past to the present. For instance, according to what is written in the decree, Russia has an extraordinary deterrence factor based on this system, which is seen not only as deterrence but also as a defense policy. The main thing in this defense policy is to face whether the opponent can reach his goal. This is clear proof that the state trusts its deterrence ability.
REFERENCES
The Journal of Interdisciplinary History içinde. The MIT Press, 1991.
«ARBATOV, Alexey. Nuclear Deterrence: A Guarantee for or Threat to Strategic Stability?. In: NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2021. p. 65-86.»
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SYMBOLS: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making içinde, yazan Karsten J. Frey. Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI, 2006.
International Security içinde, yazan Henrik Stålhane Hiim Ian Bowers. 2021.
Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics içinde, yazan Michael Keane. Naval Institute Press, 2005.
«Questioning The Morality Of Nuclear Deterrence.» After The Cold War içinde, yazan Charles Kegley. 1991.
Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence içinde, yazan Steven E. Miller. 2014.
Sokov, Dr. Nikolai. Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.
https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Ukaz-on-nuclear-deterrence_final.pdf.
French Nuclear Deterrence Policy, Forces, içinde, yazan Bruno Tertrais.
WFPHA | World Federation of Public Health Associations.
https://www.wfpha.org/.
The Myth Of Nuclear Deterrence içinde, yazan Ward Wilson. 2008.
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